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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CLARK ROGERSON,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
HANK GALETKA, Warden,
Utah State Prison, et. al.,

Case No. 960330 CA

Respondent/Appellees.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
On appeal from the dismissal of Petition for Extraordinai
Relief in the Third Judicial District Court which occurred on
October 23, 1995, before the Honorable David S. Young.

Lorenzo K. Miller
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents/Appellees
330 South 300 East, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

CLARK ROGERSON
Appearing Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CLARK ROGERSON,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 960330 CA

HANK GALETKA, Warden,
Utah State Prison, et. al.,
Respondent/Appellees.

Comes now Petitioner/Appellant CLARK ROGERSON, appearing pr:
se, pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(Utah R. App. P.) and hereby respectfully submits the following
opening Brief Memorandum regarding the dismissal of his claims :::
Third District Court that the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole held
an untimely parole revocation hearing in his case.
FACTS
On or about November 22, 1994, Petitioner/Appellant was
paroled from the Utah State Prison.

Petitioner/Appellant was larer

arrested on a Board of Pardons warrant on May 16, 1995, and he
subsequently waived his rights to a pre-revocation hearing.

On

August 16, 1995, Petitioner /Appellant Rogerson appeared before the

1

Utah Board of Pardons and Parole for his parole revocation hearing.
Petitioner's Board appointed counsel motioned for dismissal of the
technical (non-felony, non-misdemeanor) parole violation charge of
failing to attend therapy sessions based upon the Board's lack of
timeliness in bringing the Petitioner/Appellant before them.
as ninety-one
arrest

and

This

(91) days had elapsed since Petitioner/Appellant's

detention

on

the

Board

warrant

and

neither

the

Petitioner/Appellant, the Board of Pardons, or counsel for either
party had motioned for continuance according the Board's own rules.
See R671-504 of the Utah Administrative Code (UAC).
This motion for dismissal was denied by the Board hearing
officer that Petitioner/Appellant initially appeared in front of,
and

Petitioner/Appellant

was

given

a new

parole

release

effective March 26, 1996, for his technical violation.

dare

However, on

or about September 5, 1995, it appears that Petitioner/Appellant
again appeared before the Board, although he was not allowed to be
present for this hearing.

Petitioner/Appellant's parole release

date of March 26, '1996, was rescinded and he was scheduled for a
rehearing (additional order to re-appear) in November 1996 with the
additional stipulation that he undergo psychological testing.
On

the

19th

of

September,

1995,

Petitioner/Appellant

petitioned for extraordinary relief in the Third District Court and
the case was assigned to Honorable David S. Young.

On October 23,

1995, Judge Young held a hearing, where after a short exchange

2

between

Petitioner/Appellant

General,

the

petition

was

and

the

Assistant

dismissed.

Utah

Attorney

Petitioner/Appellant

subsequently filed a Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment of
dismissal on October 24, 1995, which was denied when the Court
affirmed its decision of dismissal in a minute entry on November
13, 1995.
ARGUMENT
I. THE UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S
RIGHTS BY NOT CONDUCTING HIS PAROLE VIOLATION HEARING IN A TIMELY
MANNER.
Petitioner/Appellant

contends

that

for

the Utah

Board

of

Pardons and Parole to have a rule where they say that parole
violation (revocation) hearings will be held within ninety days of
the

offender's

re-arrest

and

incarceration,

see

R671-504

Utah

Administrative Code, then to exceed this limitation without good
cause

or

"upon motion by

inmate, counsel, or the

Board," has

violated his rights to a timely parole violation hearing.
In Malek v. Sawava, 730 P.2d

(Utah 1986), the issue of the

Board1s own rules being mandatory or discretionary was before this
Court.

However, as can be seen from the decision in Malek, neither

counsel for Malek, Mary Corporon, or the Utah Assistant Attorney
General appearing in the case, Carlie Christensen, properly briefed
this issue.

Therefore, this Court did not have a fully developed

record and/or argument upon which to base it's decision.

The Court

therefore only assumed that in the case of Malek the timeliness
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rule/ then in the U t a h C o d e , w a s d i s c r e t i o n a r y .
Now,

the rules

f o r the conduct

of p a r o l e

violation

or

revocation h e a r i n g a r e n o t only in t h e Utah C o d e , b u t the Board's
own

rules

as

set

forth

in

the

Utah

Administrative

Code.

Petitioner/Appellant admits that mandatory language i 3 not pre5ent
ii 1. ti le rule regarding timeliness of parole revocation hearing R671504 UAC, and that in Morrissev v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct.

2593, 33 I ,.Ed.2d 484 (1972), the landmark case U.S. Supreme Court
case regarding parole revocation, a delay or lapse of sixty (60)
days was held to re not presumptively prejudicial.

However, in the

instant case, the Rule 671-504 specifically states that the parole
revocation hearing will be held withi n ni net y ( 90 ) days unless the
parolee, counsel, or the Board itself motions for a extension or
continuance.

This did not occur in this case.

And although the

Petitioner/Appellant's hearing was held almost right on the limit
of the time period stated in the rule, it must be noted that his
counsel

motioned

for

dismissal,

this

was

denied

and

Petitioner/Appellant was given a new parole release date for his
technical violation.

See Attachment #1, copy of Board's decision

from August 1995 hearing.
any

nine ty

(90)

Petitioner/Appellant

day
being

Then, the Board met again, well after
t ime
present,

per 1c cl,

and

w i t h o u b __ the

on S e p t e m b e r

5 , 1 9 9 5 , and

decided Petitioner/Appellant's sentence again, iss^ ling h i m ar 1 order
to re-appear in November 1996.

See A t t a c h m e n t # 2 , copy of Board's
4

ievision f^--

?

ec~cr:--^

Petitioner/Appellant's

, 1995 hearing.
due process
u

notwithstano: ro "he facr
5, 1995, hearing.
in

Labrum

y.

r

vvi

r r

^

This is a violation of

right

to a

Timely

hearing,

a m-^ present. •*_ rm;e Septerrujer

Also, according this Court's logic as set forth

iTnh

c 1. , of Pardons,

:

^Al ?.~ i

- , 907

(Utah

1993) (parole is sentencing under Utah's indetermination sentencing
system), Petitioner/Appellant was given multiple sentences for the
same technical parole violation which is a violation of both the
Utah

and

federal

punishments/doi ib.I <-

:

Constitutions

regarding

multiple

e /•par::"/.

II.
THE UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND' PAROLE VIOLATED
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY NOT ACCORDING THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT THE
"RIGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS" THAT WERE IN EFFECT UPON HIS INITIAL
HEARING.
In one Utah Administrative Code (UAC) , R671-301-1 states that
the offender "will be afforded all the rights and consiaerations
that

were

in effect

upon

his initial

parole

hearing,"

This

logically follows as the setting of a parole release date is still
n +-

i o o n o

C o o

D u 7 1 _ QfV

du

ioouc.

ubfa

rv o / -L J KJ ±.

As

evidenced

Petitioner/Appellant's
Petitioner/Appellant

_ "•

T1-1

•7^

J_ U L a u

from

A Hrrv -' ^ ^ o -*- -v~ ->+--? T -»- Q

.H-CLux i.. _ ;D ^ _ ci L. ~ v e

the

offenses
first

case
on

appeared

Pardons in approximately 1977.

^ ^ r^ r>

^ ^ 'Jc

numbers

Attachments
before

[ TJ7\ r* \
1

\ un ^ ; .

listed
#1

the Utah

and
Board

for
#2,
of

Although the rules and statutes of

the Board and the State of Utar i i lave changed since 197 7, the Board
itself recognizes by enacting this rule that those offenders who
must re-appear before the Board should oe givei i consideration under

iihe same rules in effect when they committed their initial offense.
See e.g. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d
17

(1981) (Ex posr, facto

prevents

enactment of laws that

either

impose punishments for acts not punishable at the time they were
committed or increase punishment over that previously prescribed) .
The

Board

had

Petitioner/Appellant

no

provision

under

for

advisement."

This

"taking

the

violation

of

Petitioner-Appellant's rights requires remedy before this Court.
III.
THE UZAh
iioru^ wi PARDONS AND PAROLE VIOLATED
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND UTAH STATE LAW (OPEN PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT)
BY N O T CONDUCTING H: PAROLE VIOLATION HEARING IN AN OPEN SESSION.
According the Utah Code Title 77 Section 27 and the Utah Board
of Pardons own rules as contained within the Utah Administrative
Code

(UAC) the "Board of Pardons hearings shall be open to the

pub 1 i ' " iirr "^^ 1 -":'' • :>~~1
Pardons,

836 P.2d

790,

:

(Utah

v:

See also Ai iarews

1' '.

1992).

This comports

Utah

Bd.

to a basic

fairness.
However, in the Petitioner-Appellant's case the Board violated
this precept.

Petitioner/Appellant initially appeared, i n front of

the Board on August 16, 1995, and was given a new parole release
date

effective

March

26,

1996,

for

his

technical

violation.

However, on or aoout September 5, 1995, Petitioner/Appellant again
appeared
present
hearing.

before

the

Board,

for this hearing,

although

he was

not

allowed

nor was he given any notice

of

to

be

this

Petitioner/Appellant's parole release date of March 26,
6

of

1996, granted at the August 16, 1995 hearing was rescinded and he
was scheduled for a rehearing
November

(additional order to re-appear) in

1996 with the additional

stipulation

that he undergo

psychological testing.
This is a clear violation of several state and federal laws
and

constitutional

Meetings Act.

provisions,

including

the Utah

Open

See Utah Code Ann. S2_ - _H_ -_J_ e_L seq.

Public
For the

touchstone of due process is the protection of the individual from
arbitrary action by the government.
U.S.

114, 123

(quoting

from

(1889);

Daniels

Dent v. West Virginia, 129

v. Williams,

106 S.Ct. At

665

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).

Not

only must an individual be given notice and an opportunity to
respond to the allegations or material to be used against him, very
important in such a case as this where the Utah Board of Pardons
performs a sentencing function, but implicit in the concept of due
process as well are the ideas that government must follow its own
rules and that it must do so within a reasonable time.

See Layton

v. Swapp, 484 F.Supp. 958 (D.Utah 1979).
Here it appears the Board met on the very limit of it's own
rule on timely hearings, see Rule 671-504 UAC, then almost three
weeks later met in an illegal, closed session to change the first
decision in Petitioner-Appellant Rogerson's case.
arise

about

the

basic

fairness

of

such

a

Questions also

hearing

where

the

Petitioner-Appellant was not allowed to be present, and whether the

7

Petitioner-Appellant was prejudiced by his assertion of his rights
at the August 16, 1995 hearing where he had counsel motion for
dismissal of the technical parole violation charge as untimely.
See e.g. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 839 P.2d 874 (Utah App.
1992).
The record in Petitioner's case, although it was not allowed
to be developed in the District Court due to the dismissal by Judge
Young, would have shown that Petitioner-Appellant
completed

any

previously

and

required

unconstitutional
effect

an

ail

therapies

of

him.

September

additional

and

The

programs

punishment

the

stipulation

5, 1995 closed
meted

out

Rogerson had
Board

added

Board hearing
to

the

at

had
the

is in

Petitioner-

Appellant for the assertion of his rights at an earlier hearing.
This is blatantly illegal.
retaliation

against

constitutional right.

a

The United States Constitution forbids

person

for

exercising

a

statutory

or

Blackledae v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct.

2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974).

Such actions by the Board are similar

to "star chambers'7 of ancient jurisprudence which are both illegal
and counterproductive to our current system of justice.
Conclusion
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing facts and argument, the
Petitioner-Appellant

respectfully requests this honorable Court

rule that the Third District Court, Judge David S. Young presiding,
abused his discretion in dismissing Petitioner-Appellant's Petition

8

for Extraordinary Relief.

Further, Petitioner-Appellate requests

this Court, upon the issuance of a declaration of PetitionerAppellant's rights as a technical parole revocation hearing,
remand to the lower court for a full evidentiary hearing, to the
ultimate end of Petitioner-Appellant's re-instatement upon parole
or, in the alternative, full discharge from custody of the
Department of Corrections.
DATED this

3f ^

day of ___

1996,

M^

C-WyTC
/V
CLARK ROGERSON ^
Appearing Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the
of

» r
JL%< l^ *da/

, 1996, I mailed, a true and correct copy

*??ISUA,

of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to:
Ms. Nancy L. Kemp, Esq.
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents/Appellees
/

k> O g a ^

£ £>a ^£cr*c^<£-

Salt Lake City, Utah

84114

^v-tf^y-J t

O

^

9
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Name "j

%cS?|f

USP #

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON

FOR

Hearing Date
The Board of Pardons decifiHtofr^

Hearing Type

1

AGGRAVATING

/
/
/
/
lyV^
'y/V

.
MITIGATIKG
OFFEJTOER nD BACKGROUND
Criminal history significant^ underrepresented by guidelines
(i.e., more than 4 felony convictions and/or 8 misdemeanors)
History of similar offenses
Pattern of
increasingly or
or decreasingly serious offenses
History
of unsuccessful
unsuccessful
History
of
01 successful supervisions

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
, „
}
'
'„ /(>^v»'
^. * -~
/ Use
use of
or weapons
weapons or
or dangerous
dangerous instrumentalities
ins trumen c a n Lies
/ Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity ^
* ^v
~r
Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility i v
:iple incidents and/or victims
Multiple
Personal gain reaped from the offense

J,

**Jra, ^OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THEJt OFFENSE
^ + Motive^ (intentional, prerfreditafefed V£. impulsive, reactionary)
f Role (organizert leader v&. follower, minimal participant)
V
Obstruction of
of justice
lustice v£.
vs. early
earlv withdrawal
withdrawal or
or self-surrender
self-surrenc
Obstruction
.
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS
Extent of injury (physical} emotional, financial, social)
Relatively vulnerable victim vg.^ aggr^LS^i^e' or' provoking victim
Victim in position of authority"tJVer^offender
/IJei^ai^d^^
-&9&i

of responsibility
* ' Repeated, numerous' v&. first/incarceration or parole-xevoca^Jjqn
' / ^c.fcs-bgrnt;- cfc^-remorse and apparent motivation ta rehabilitate 7 . . ^
_
^S Tiipel&ess^ aridt.e^tent^fe£|or£s t o w restitution, .„._.
•%^m^^^^m^r,
I Frison programming (effort to ^enroll, nature of programmingr .
Prison disciplinary problems or other defiance or authority . •
Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future)
Extent of community fear, condemnation
.
Degree of meaningful support system
......
Nature and stability of release plans
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other)
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise . . .
Lengthy history of alcohol/drug abuse v&. apparent rehabilitation
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges • . •
Likely release to detainer
. ±
OTHER
>

flfeed updated pfu

Date

"

•

fepfT -fe nv\*w -risk"1-

/

Board Member

y

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH STATE OBSCIS MO. 99914009
Consideration of the Status "of RQGERSQN, CLARK T_,

PRISON NO.

14009

Tne above-entitled matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board
of Pardons on the 5th day of September, J:99:5, for:

PAROLE AGREEMENT VIOLATION
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing3 the Board
ma^as tne foiiOv7iu-< decision and order:

REoJLi 3_
Revoke Lr/22/1994 parole* Renaariag set
for ii/193-5 vita an Alienist report due
prior to hearing.
Modification of interim decision of
"JS/IO^
to oarole on 03/26/96.

No Crime

Sent Case No.

dad^-:

Aspiration

Tnis decision Is subject to review and modification oy the Board of Pardons
any tiiae until iCtuai release from custody.
By order of tue Board of Paraons of the State of Utaii, I have this date
otn day of Septemper, 1995, affixed tay signature as Tnairnaa for and
on behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons.

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The status of R.QGZRSOH, ::iARX T
, US? Nu. 14G09
, 033-.:i2 Mo, 9991hjQ9
came before the Utan State Boara or Pardons for a Purole la vocation Iiearing on
the iota day of August. 1995.

Schedule reueari ig for

\/_ Qthac-. ((jipwjpii jyitrhtMA -h~fBA.WMC((!il^a:fiM^

-ft oh tJLjmhmdmhiipMwd. <

OPn Q Oritur

—

-*-

The reasons for this decision are identified on tne ,.3ttacnad page.
At the discretion of can Board of Pardons, this decision is subject to review
and modification at J.^y tiiae prior to actual release iron custody.
3y order of the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah, I affix my signature
on behalf or tne Caairmaa ot the 3oard this loth day of August, 1995,

^x^s^1"*?

Name

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
/

/^

RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON

A? /?*< 9^

FOR

/^Vo ^.

Hearing Date

l

/

•v'Jns^

Hearing Type

The Board of Pardons' decision is based, on the following factors:
AGGRAVATING

MITIG,
OFFENDER.19RJBACKGRODND
:

Criminal history significantiy «nderrepresented by guidelines
(i.e., more than 4 felony convictions and/or 8 misdemeanors)
^ y History of similar offenses
"**~
y< Pattern of increasingly or decreasingly serious offenses . . .
History of unsuccessful or successful supervisions . . . . . .
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE
Use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities
Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity
Abuse of position of trust, special skill, or responsibility
Multiple incidents and/or victims
Personal gain reaped from the offense
OFFENDERS TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE
Motive (intentional, premeditated vs. impulsive, reactionary) .
Role (organizer^ leader v&. follower, minimal participant) . .
Obstruction of justice vg. early withdrawal or self-surrender •
VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS
Extent of injury (physical? emotional, financial, social)
Relatively vulnerable victim vs.. aggressive or provoking victim
Victim in position of authority over offender
OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS
Denial or minimization vs. complete acceptance of responsibility
Repeated, numerous vs.. first incarceration or parole revocation
Extent or remorse and apparent motivation to rehabilitate . . •
Timeliness and extent OL efforts to pay restitution
Prison pr-^n^-pin? f .-"fort ^~o enroll^ r.a^ire of programming) .
Prison disciplinary prooierns or other aer^ance or authority . ,
Employment possibilities (history, skills, current job, future)
Extent of community fear, condemnation * . . . .
Degree of meaningful support system
. . . . . . . . .
Nature and stability of release^plans • • . • v «* . . . . . . .
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other)
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise,^ . . . . . . . . .
Lengthy history of alconol/dru^abuse vs. apparent rehabilJ ration
Substantial continuous period in custody on other charges . . .
Likely release to detainer -v. *L."

X
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&
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